This paper jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder distributions following a 2003 reduction in the dividend and capital gains tax rates for individuals. We find that directors and officers, but not other individual investors, rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns in light of the new tax rules. We also find that firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically, dividends versus share repurchases) in a manner consistent with the altered tax incentives for individual investors. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to employ simultaneous equations to estimate both investor and managerial responses to the 2003 rate reductions. We find that estimating a system of equations leads to different inferences.
INTRODUCTION
This paper jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder distributions following a 2003 reduction in dividend and capital gains tax rates. We predict that individual investors, the only ones affected by the reduction in shareholder taxes, rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns in light of the new tax rules. We also predict that firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically, dividends versus share repurchases) to maximize share value, i.e., distributing profits in a manner that was most attractive to their investors after considering shareholder taxes. With regard to investor responses, we find evidence that insiders (i.e., directors and officers) increased holdings in their own companies if their dividend-repurchase mix reflected the new tax incentives. However, we find no evidence that other individual investors rebalanced their portfolios. With regard to managerial responses, we find that firms with disproportionately large individual holdings modified their payouts in a manner consistent with the altered tax incentives. However, changes in dividend and repurchase policy were not immediate; firms deferred widespread, substantial changes until the second quarter following enactment.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to jointly estimate investor and firm responses to changes in shareholder taxes. The fact that both investors and firms can change their behavior following a change in shareholder taxes presents an identification problem. To illustrate, suppose we test for an association between dividend yields and individual stock ownership and find that the correlation becomes more positive following a reduction in individual dividend tax rates. Such a finding is consistent with both (1) individuals switching to high-dividend-paying firms following the tax cut (i.e., a tax clientele response) and (2) firms that are held mostly by individuals increasing their dividends following the tax reduction (a firm payout response). To distinguish between investors' rebalancing their portfolios and firms' altering their distributions, this study estimates simultaneous equations. Prior studies have focused on either investors or managers, but not both.
To maximize the power of our tests, we compare a firm's ownership and dividendrepurchase mix before and after the largest change in U.S. dividend taxation. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) reduced, for individuals only, the maximum, statutory dividend tax rate from 38.6% to 15%. It also lowered the maximum, statutory individual capital gains tax rate, which applies to share repurchases, from 20% to 15%.
In many ways, JGTRRA is an ideal legislative setting for testing an association between shareholder taxes and payout policy. The scope of JGTRRA was narrow. Its genesis was individual dividend tax reduction. Its primary amendment was individual capital gains tax relief. 1 The final bill did little more than reduce dividend and capital gains tax rates.
Nonetheless, the economic effects were huge.
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Because of its narrow focus and big impact, the JGTRRA provides a much stronger setting than other shareholder tax rate changes, which were either much smaller (e.g., Tax Relief Act of 1997) or involved widespread overhaul of the tax system that affected far more than just shareholder taxes (Tax Reform Act of 1986).
The JGTRRA dividend and capital gains tax cuts should have altered the optimal mix of dividends and repurchases for at least some individual investors. As a result, we expect that some individuals rebalanced their portfolio so that a higher proportion of their equity returns came in the form of dividends. Consistent with such portfolio rebalancing, Desai and Dharmapala (2010) report that total U.S. equity investments shifted from foreign countries 1 For the legislative history, see Auerbach and Hassett (2006) . 2 The size of the tax savings has been very large. In September 2007, the U.S. Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation reported that the 2003 dividend and capital gains tax rates will cost the Treasury $632 billion between 2007 and 2011, the largest tax expenditure in the tax code. whose companies did not qualify for the lower dividend tax rates to foreign countries whose companies did quality for the lower dividend tax rates. However, to our knowledge, no one has documented whether individual investors rebalanced their much larger holdings of domestic holdings in a manner consistent with the changed tax incentives following passage of the JGTRRA. This study addresses this void by studying the domestic portfolio rebalancing of three different individual investor groups.
To attract individual investors who were looking for more dividends following passage of the legislation, we expect that at least some firms increased the dividend portion of their distributions. Consistent with such a managerial response, Chetty and Saez (2005) document that dividend initiations jumped in 2003. Brown et al. (2007) add that reductions in share repurchases funded these 2003 dividend initiations and such substitution was limited to companies where directors and officers held disproportionately large shares. They find no similar managerial responses among the set of firms that account for almost all dividend issuances, i.e., the firms paying dividends before JGTRRA, or among firms without high insider ownership. 3 Comparing executive compensation in 2003 and 2002 , Aboody and Kasznik (2008 also reach mixed conclusions about the changes in the dividend-repurchase mix.
We conduct a more comprehensive study of the managerial responses to JGTRRA by looking at dividend-paying firms (which far exceed initiators in number and payout), studying both insiders and other individual investors, and extending the analysis to include changes in distribution policies through 2005 (two years beyond these extant JGTRRA studies). 3 Brown et al. (2007) are careful to state that their inferences about substitution are limited to 2003 dividend initiators. That said, because their sample includes both initiators and non-initiating firms, it was unclear to us whether the findings reported in Table VI of their paper shed any light on the firm responses of non-initiators. Private conversations with the authors confirmed that their conclusions were limited to 2003 dividend initiators. In addition, to enable us to investigate the non-initiators in their study more closely, the authors kindly provided us with their data for which we were most appreciative. We replicated their results, and, consistent with the inferences in their paper and our conversations with them, we found that their results only hold for firms that initiated in 2003.
Lengthening the investigation period enables us to calibrate how long it took investors and managers to respond to JGTRRA. We also estimate a system of equations and find that results are statistically and economically more significant under simultaneous equations than they are under ordinary least squares.
To test for investor and firm responses, we compare the percentage of shares held before and after JGTRRA for three groups of individual investors: insiders (i.e., directors and officers of the firm), other non-executive individuals investing on their own account, and mutual fund investors. 4 We aggregate each firm's dividends and repurchases during the eight quarters immediately preceding the quarter of enactment and compute the ratio of dividends to total payout (dividends plus repurchases).
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We compare that ratio to the one formed with aggregated dividends and repurchases for the eight quarters immediately after the quarter of enactment. We then test for an association between the change in shareholders and change in the dividendrepurchase mix. This difference-in-differences approach mitigates the likelihood of spurious conclusions arising from omitted correlated variables. Estimating a system of equations enables us to determine whether the association is driven by tax clientele effects, payout changes, or both.
We find evidence consistent with both investor and firm responses to JGTRRA.
However, insiders are the only investors who appear to have altered their holdings in response to JGTRRA. We find stronger evidence that firms modified their payout policy in response to changes in shareholder taxes. In particular, we find that the movement toward distributing a larger proportion of profits as dividends was greatest among those companies held 4 Many mutual fund investors are not individuals and the earnings for many mutual funds held by individuals are not subject to JGTRRA, e.g., 401(k) investments. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the extent to which JGTRRA affects specific mutual funds' investor base. This limitation biases against our finding a response by mutual fund investors. 5 We aggregate to reduce some of the noise arising because repurchases, unlike regular quarterly dividends, are uneven and irregular. disproportionately by individual investors, particularly directors and officers, but also those firms where other individual and mutual funds had large holdings. We find that firms began to substantially alter their distribution policies in the second quarter following passage, consistent with firms needing time to adjust their dividend and repurchase policies.
The next section develops testable hypotheses. Section III details the research design.
Section IV presents the empirical findings. Closing remarks follow.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Framework
This paper does not attempt to tackle the longstanding puzzle of why firms pay dividends when they could distribute profits through share repurchases, which remain tax-advantaged, though less so, even after JGTRRA. Rather, in a nutshell, we: (a) accept the fact that investors desired and some firms paid dividends before JGTRRA (obviously for non-tax reasons), (b) assume that the mix of dividends and repurchases was optimal before passage of the legislation, (c) expect that the large tax rate reductions for dividends (compared with the relatively modest reductions for capital gains) led some individuals to rebalance their portfolios in favor of dividend income, and (d) predict that some firms, in response to the changing tax incentives for individual investors, increased the portion of their distributions in the form of dividends after JGTRRA. The remainder of this section elaborates on these relations to develop formal hypotheses about the impact of JGTRRA on shareholder distributions.
6 For a sampling of the "dividend puzzle" literature, see Miller and Modigliani (1961) , Feldstein and Green (1983) , Bagwell and Shoven (1989 ), Berhheim (1991 ), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000 , Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Fama and French (2001) , Grullon and Michaely (2002) , Dhaliwal and Li (2006) , Gordon and Dietz, 2006 and Saez, 2007 , among many others. On a different note, even though both repurchases and dividends now face a maximum tax rate of 15%, repurchases remain tax-advantaged for at least two reasons. First, sellers can offset the tax basis of the shares that they sell against the proceeds from the sale in computing their capital gains. Second, they can offset those capital gains with capital losses that otherwise might not be deductible. This contrasts with dividends, where the entire amount is taxed upon receipt.
To develop the intuition for our hypotheses, we start with a simple framework.
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Absent taxes, suppose that all investors hold optimally diversified portfolios of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. In that setting, shareholder ownership of stocks should not vary across investors with similar risk preferences. Now suppose some investors (call them individuals) become taxed on their dividend income. These individual investors will no longer hold the original, pre-tax, optimally diversified portfolio. Rather, they will underweight their portfolio in tax-disfavored dividend-paying stocks and overweight their portfolio in tax-favored, no-dividend stocks. This shift will boost the price of no-dividend stocks and drive down the price of dividend-paying stocks. These price movements will entice non-individual investors (call them tax-exempts) to hold more dividend stocks and less no-dividend stocks. As a result, each investor ultimately would hold the portfolio that features his optimal tradeoff between risk and after-tax return; the share price of each stock would equate supply and demand; and a heterogeneous mix of shareholders would emerge endogenously. One example of an empirical study of such tax clientele responses is Dhaliwal, et al. (1999) , who document increases in institutional holdings when firms initiate dividends, which are tax-disadvantaged to individual investors.
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Similarly, if individuals were taxed more heavily on dividends than on share repurchases, then they would overweight their portfolios with stocks that distributed disproportionate amounts of profits through repurchases, as compared with dividends. Meanwhile, non-individual investors would overweight their portfolios with stocks that distributed disproportionate amounts 7 We appreciate the contributions of an anonymous referee in sketching out the framework that we rely on in this paper. 8 Moser and Puckett (2009) include the JGTRRA in their study of whether there is a positive association between the portion of dividend-paying securities in tax-advantaged institutions' portfolios and the dividend penalty. Although they find evidence of a positive association, their analysis is confounded by the inclusion of financial institutions as tax-advantaged institutions (Blouin 2009). 9 We are assuming that tax-sensitive investors do not interpret any potential dividend and repurchase signals differently from other market participants.
of profits through dividends, as compared with share repurchases. In this setting, managers would choose both the level and mix (dividends versus share repurchases) of shareholder distributions that maximizes the firm's stock price. Their distribution policy would affect both the equilibrium price and the equilibrium mix of investors and changes in their payout policy will induce a change in the mix of investors that own the firm.
Now suppose the dividend tax rate was cut. Individual investors would rebalance their portfolios, adding more dividend-paying stocks than was optimal under the prior high-dividend tax regime. This will drive up the price of dividend-paying stocks, altering the optimal portfolio mix for tax-exempt investors who would now shift from dividend-paying stocks to no-dividend stocks at the margin. At the same time that investors would be adjusting their portfolios in light of the changes in dividend tax policy, managers would be revising their level and mix of shareholder distributions in light of the new tax policy to continue to maximize their stock price.
As a result, both the investor mix (individuals versus tax-exempts) and the firm's distribution policy (dividends versus share repurchases) would change after a reduction in the dividend tax rate.
To determine the relative importance of the investor response and the firm's response would require joint evaluation of both investors' and managers' incentives. Studies that examine only individual investors' new tax-motivated demand for dividends might erroneously attribute all of the increase in dividends to a clientele effect. In the extreme, this is true even if investors did not rebalance their portfolio but rather, firms simply increased their dividend payouts.
Likewise, studies (such as several prior examinations of JGTRRA) that focused solely on firm's new tax-driven supply of dividends might erroneously attribute increased dividend income by individuals to a payout response when the result was actually due to individual investors rebalancing their portfolios. In the tests below, we find evidence of both a clientele and a managerial response to shareholder tax rate reductions.
Investor Responses
We begin our hypothesis development by focusing on potential investor responses to JGTRRA. We assume that because the decline in the dividend tax rate (from 38.6% to 15%) exceeded the decrease in the capital gains tax rate (from 20% to 15%) that the net effect of JGTRRA was to make firms that distributed profits mostly through dividends more attractive for individual investors than those that distribute profits mostly through share repurchases.
Assuming investors were holding the optimal portfolio (considering risk and taxes) before JGTRRA's enactment, we predict that, after enactment, individual investors altered their portfolios to receive a higher percentage of their returns in the form of dividends. That said, it is important to recognize that investors cannot freely rebalance their portfolios. Besides commissions and other transaction costs that investors face on all trades, taxable investors pay capital gains taxes on any excess of the proceeds from the sale of the stock over the basis of the stock. Thus, some investors may have accepted an inferior portfolio, rather than incur the tax and non-tax costs of rebalancing their portfolio. This is one reason why we might not observe investors engaging in widespread rebalancing following JGTRRA.
Firm Responses
Meanwhile, we anticipate that firms will respond to individual investors' enhanced interest in dividends by increasing the portion of profits that they distribute in the form of dividends. Those firms wishing to retain or increase their holdings by individual investors are likely to distribute more of their profits as dividends, following enactment, than other firms.
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the pool of future shareholders that firms hope to attract by adjusting their payout policy. Therefore, we look to their shareholder mix at passage and assume that firms with larger individual owners at enactment would be more likely to alter their distribution policy to distribute more of their profits as dividends than those firms with little, if any, individual ownership. To the extent a firm's current investor mix is not a good predictor of managers' desired investor mix in the future, our tests are biased against finding a firm response to JGTRRA. Democratic Presidential candidate, John Kerry, pledged to restore the higher dividend tax rates for the two highest tax brackets, if elected. Since dividends tend to be sticky and the markets historically punish firms for decreasing dividends, many firms may have chosen to leave their distribution policy unchanged, delay any change until after the 2004 elections, or turn to onetime special dividends (which we ignore in this study). Second, dividends are purported to play an important role by alleviating asymmetric information through conveying private information to the market. Tax-motivated dividend changes might undermine this signal. Three, large increases in dividends could adversely affect the firm's compensation structure, particularly to the extent that the firm relies on stock options, which are not dividend-protected. Consistent with this deterrent to modifying distributions, Aboody and Kasnick (2008) find that firms that increased their dividends after JGTRRA modified their stock option and restricted stock compensation plans. In short, there were multiple reasons for firms to be hesitant about modifying their distribution policy following JGTRRA, even if individuals were seeking higher dividends than before the legislation.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
System of Regression Equations
As discussed above, we jointly evaluate the changes in investor composition and distribution policy following enactment of JGTRRA. We predict that individual investors rebalanced their portfolios so that a larger proportion of their shareholder income was in the form of dividends as opposed to share repurchases. We also expect that managers altered their distributions so that a larger proportion of their distributions were dividends and that this adjustment was increasing in the extent to which individuals owned the firm.
To jointly evaluate the impact of investor and manager responses to JGTRRA, we estimate a system of four equations (variables are defined below):
Equation (1): INSIDER = α 0 + α 1 *POST + α 2 *DIV% + α 3 *DIV%*POST + α 4 *S&PRATING + α 5 *AGE + α 6 *SP500 + α 7 *LIQUIDITY + α 8 *BETA + α 9 *IRISK + α 10 *MKTADJRET + α 11 *SALESGR + α 12 *R&DINT Equation (2): NONEXEC = δ 0 + δ 1 *POST + δ 2 *DIV% + δ 3 *DIV%*POST + δ 4 *S&PRATING + δ 5 *AGE + δ 6 *SP500 + δ 7 *LIQUIDITY + δ 8 *BETA + δ 9 *IRISK + δ 10 *MKTADJRET + δ 11 *SALESGR + δ 12 *R&DINT Equation (3): MF = γ 0 + γ 1 *POST + γ 2 *DIV% + γ 3 *DIV%*POST + γ 4 *S&PRATING + γ 5 *AGE + γ 6 *SP500 + γ 7 *LIQUIDITY + γ 8 *BETA + γ 9 *IRISK + γ 10 *MKTADJRET + γ 11 *SALESGR + γ 12 *R&DINT Equation (4): DIV% = β 0 + β 1 *POST + β 2 *INSIDER + β 3 *INSIDER*POST + β 4 *NONEXEC + β 5 *NONEXEC*POST + β 6 *MF + β 7 *MF*POST + β 8 *RE + β 9 *PERM + β 10 *TRANS + β 11 *FCF + β 12 *DYIELD + β 13 *LEVERAGE + β 14 *SIZE + Industry Dummies
To capture investor responses, the first three equations regress the percentage of the firm held by 
Dividends-to-Payout Ratio Variable
The percentage of the firm's payouts that are dividends (DIV%) is an explanatory variable in the first three equations and the dependent variable in the final equation. DIV% is a ratio where the numerator is the sum of dividends over an eight-quarter period. The denominator is the sum of dividends and share repurchases over the same eight quarters. There are two eightquarter periods for each firm. The first eight quarters are the eight quarters immediately before the fiscal quarter in which JGTRRA was enacted.
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The second eight quarters are the eight quarters immediately following the fiscal quarter in which the JGTRRA was enacted.
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Consequently, each firm has two DIV% measures-one before enactment and one after enactment.
We aggregate distributions over a two-year period because, unlike regular, quarterly dividends, share repurchases are irregular. Therefore, focusing on the dividend-repurchase mix in a single quarter could introduce excessive noise. That said, in sensitivity tests later in the paper, we relax this aggregation requirement and report results on a quarterly basis. Inferences are largely unaltered.
We can measure repurchases in two ways. One option is total share repurchases.
Another option is net repurchases, i.e., total share repurchases less stock issuances.
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We use net repurchases because we are interested in the cash that the firm could have distributed as dividends. Fama and French (2001) note that dividends cannot substitute for repurchases in many situations. Firms need shares for executive compensation, stock option exercises, stock acquisitions, and funding employee stock ownership plans, among other things. Thus, consistent with Fama and French (2001) , we measure net repurchases as the change in treasury stock.
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If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then we truncate our measure of repurchases at zero. 10 We exclude the enactment quarter (May 2003) because it is unclear which tax regime managers were contemplating when they issued dividends and repurchased shares during that quarter. We treat the first quarter of 2003 as a pre-enactment quarter, even though the legislation was retroactive to the beginning of the year. The reason is that passage of the legislation was uncertain until Vice-President Cheney's tiebreaking vote in the U.S. Senate in May. Sensitivity tests, detailed below, provide assurance that this classification is appropriate. In addition, inferences hold if we exclude any 2003 quarters from the pre-enactment period. 11 Blouin and Krull (2009) show that share repurchases rose in 2005 as firms enjoyed a tax holiday for repatriating earnings from foreign subsidiaries. When we replicate our analysis excluding the 2005 quarters, inferences hold. 12 For further detail, see the discussion in footnotes 5 and 6 of Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson and Roberts (2007) and footnote 9 of Skinner (2007). 13 Using treasury stock to measure repurchases is not without limitations. As Fama and French (2001) point out, using annual changes in treasury stock will fail to match a repurchase in one year and its reissuance in another year. This problem is mitigated in our research design because we combine two years of activity into one observation. However, even aggregation over two years cannot fully eliminate the potential mismeasurement.
For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we measure net repurchases as total repurchases from the statement of cash flows less decreases in preferred stock.
For post-enactment observations in the first three regressions, we interact DIV% with POST, a categorical variable that equals one for observations after the May 23, 2003 enactment (i.e., quarters after the second quarter of 2003). In these three tax clientele tests, positive coefficients on DIV%*POST (the coefficients are α 3 , δ 3 , and γ 3 in the system of equations) will be interpreted as evidence that, after passage of the JGTRRA, individuals rebalanced their portfolios by shifting toward stocks where dividends constituted a larger portion of total payouts.
We also include POST as a separate variable in each regression equation to capture any other temporal change.
Investor Group Variables
We employ three variables to capture the portion of the firm owned by individual 14 Note that these shareholders play dual roles-as the managers setting distribution policy and as individual shareholders, often with large stockholdings and suffering from inadequate diversification.
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The second measure of individual ownership is NONEXEC, which is intended to measure all individual holdings, other than those by insiders or through mutual funds. Ideally, we would 14 The reporting of holdings of insiders is mandated by Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which applies to every person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of equity security registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act and each director and officer (collectively, "reporting persons" or "insiders") of the issuer of the security. On a different note, conclusions do not change if we limit INSIDER to direct holdings, excluding shares held by family members, trusts and corporations controlled by the insider, and similar related parties. 15 Brown, et al. (2007) report that insiders were particularly influential among dividend initiators in 2003. They present evidence consistent with dividends crowding out repurchases in firms with large insider holdings. However, they find no such substitution or insider influence among companies that were paying dividends before JGTRRA, which is the group of firms that is the focus of this paper's analysis. 
Control variables
Theory is not sufficiently rich to provide much guidance concerning the control variables in a system of equations where the dependent variables are investor composition and the mix of dividends and repurchases. To our knowledge, no paper models the non-tax variables that should vary with the dependent variables in this study. Thus, we control for a host of factors that have been found to be associated with the investor mix and the distribution mix.
For the three regression equations testing for clientele effects, we rely on Bushee (2001), who shows that the level of institutional ownership is associated with firm value, and Del Guercio (1996) , who documents that institutional holders tend to hold investments that are more prudent. Hence, we include a number of control variables in the investor holdings regressions to capture firm value and the relative quality of the investment. Specifically, we include SALESGR as a proxy for firm growth. It is defined as the average sales growth over the three previous years. We include two proxies for firm risk: beta (BETA), which is included to control for systematic risk and the standard deviation of the prior year's daily market model residuals (IRISK) to control for idiosyncratic risk. Market-adjusted returns over the prior year (MKTADJRET) is intended to control for firm performance, which has been found to be positively associated with institutional holdings. The S&P common stock rating (S&PRATING) and the number of years that the firm is covered by CRSP (AGE) are included to capture the relative quality of the underlying investment. The prior year's log of average monthly volume divided by shares outstanding (LIQUIDITY) is included as a control for liquidity because institutional holders prefer more liquid securities. We also include whether or not a firm is listed on the S&P 500 (SP500) as a control because many index funds are required to hold these firms.
Finally, we include R&D intensity (R&DINT), measured as research and development expenses divided by sales because Hessel and Norman (1992) report that some institutions are fixated on the R&D activity of the firm.
Concerning the fourth regression, where the dependent variable is DIV%, we take the approach of including various measures that are known to affect either dividends or repurchases, though sensitivity tests show that results are largely robust to the set of control variables. First, we include lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged total assets (RE) in the model. A firm must have earnings and profits (as defined in the tax law) for its distributions to be taxed as dividends.
Unfortunately, earnings and profits are unobservable, found only in confidential corporate tax returns. Thus, we use retained earnings as a proxy for earnings and profits. If firms with low or no retained earnings have fewer distributions that qualify as dividends, then DIV% should increase in RE. Consistent with this expectation and liquidity constraints, DeAngelo et al. (2005) report that firms with low or no retained earnings pay fewer dividends. Next, we include earnings in the model. Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) report that dividends are paid from permanent earnings whereas repurchases are paid from transitory earnings. Dittmar and Dittmar (2004) contend that both are paid from permanent earnings, but agree that repurchases come from transitory earnings. Thus, we dichotomize earnings into a permanent part (PERM) and a transitory part (TRANS). We measure PERM with operating income and TRANS as the difference between net income and operating income.
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We scale both components by lagged assets. Based on the conflicts in the prior work, we make no prediction about the sign of PERM. However, we expect DIV% should decrease in TRANS. We also include a measure of the firm's payout capacity, free cash flow scaled by lagged assets (FCF).
Dividends may be a mechanism to reduce agency problems in firms with free cash flow (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Thus, we anticipate that DIV% is increasing in FCF. We include the lagged ratio of dividends to the market value of equity (DYIELD), expecting DIV% to be increasing in the DYIELD. We add lagged long-term debt, scaled by lagged assets, (LEVERAGE) to control for cross-firm variation in capital structure. Finally, we include the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to control for any size effects. We have no expectations about the sign of the LEVERAGE and SIZE coefficients.
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS Sample Selection
We Our definition of DIV% forces us to exclude firms that distribute no profits to shareholders. We further chose to limit our tests to firms that paid dividends at least once during the eight quarters preceding JGTRRA. The reason for these limitations is two-fold. First, firms that were paying dividends before passage paid 97% of the dividends issued in the four quarters following enactment. However, much of the JGTRRA research (e.g., Saez, 2005 and Brown, et al., 2007) has focused on the relatively narrow impact of JGTRRA on dividend initiation in 2003 alone.
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Thus, this paper chooses to focus on the under-studied, but more economically significant, portion of the economy, the dividend-paying firms. Second, dividend initiation, and to a lesser extent, a firm's first share repurchase, convey more and different information to the markets than simply altering the amount of an ongoing stream of dividends or repurchases. Thus, firms that have a history of shareholder distributions likely can modify the dividend-repurchase mix at a lower cost than firms that have never paid dividends or repurchased shares. In fact, it is possible that some managers that had never paid dividends before JGTRRA considered initiating payouts in response to the changed tax incentives associated with JGTRRA but decided that the costs of initiation exceeded the benefits of attracting individual investors who were now seeking more dividend income. By limiting our analysis to dividend-paying firms, we ensure that the potential costs of dividend initiation do not affect our estimates of managerial responsiveness to the changed individual tax incentives under JGTRRA. This both increases the power of our tests and removes an additional factor that we would need to control for, if we included non-dividend-paying firms. One downside to limiting the sample to firms that were already paying dividends is that, if these firms were at their dividend capacity when JGTRRA was enacted, then they may have been unable to increase their dividend payouts, even if they had wished to respond to the changed tax incentives for individual investors.
Another distinguishing factor about our analysis of JGTRRA is that we examine investor and firm responses through 2005. Desai and Dharmapala (2010) Although we exclude non-dividend-paying firms from the primary tests in this paper, in the process of selecting the sample firms, we detect some initial evidence consistent with firms shifting from repurchases to dividends. Among the 1,923 firms from which we draw our samples, we find that 145 companies initiated dividends after JGTRRA, while only 30 firms omitted dividends (a net increase of 115 dividend issuers). Meanwhile, 222 firms began repurchasing after enactment while 370 companies stopped repurchasing (a net reduction of 148 repurchasers). We also find that 26 firms both initiated dividends and ceased repurchasing after passage of the JGTRRA, while only three firms omitted dividends and began repurchasing.
Furthermore, among 702 firms that repurchased both before and after JGTRRA, 90 initiated dividends while only ten firms omitted dividends, a net increase in dividend issuers of 80 firms.
On the other hand, among the 408 firms that paid dividends both before and after JGTRRA, 46 began repurchasing after passage, but 58 stopped buying back shares, a net decrease in repurchasers of 12 firms. All of these comparisons are consistent with firms' shifting from repurchases to dividends following enactment of the JGTRRA. Table 4 presents the primary findings in the study, summary statistics from GMM estimates of the system of four equations. To provide some perspective for those results, Tables   2 and 3 show separate OLS regression results for each of the four equations. Table 2 shows selected coefficient estimates from the first three equations where investor ownership percentages are the dependent variables and DIV%*POST is the variable of interest. Table 3 presents results for the fourth equation where DIV% is the dependent variable and the ownership percentages of the three-investor groups are explanatory variables.
Descriptive statistics
Preliminary Regression Results
Starting with Table 2 , we expect a positive coefficient on DIV%*POST, which will be interpreted as evidence that, following enactment, individual ownership increased for those firms that distributed larger portions of their profits as dividends. Using OLS, we find a positive coefficient on DIV%*POST (α 3 ) when INSIDER is the dependent variable. However, the coefficient is not significantly greater than zero at the 5% level (using a one-tailed test, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level for the Dividend Payers sample). Contrary to expectations, three of the four coefficients on DIV%*POST are negative when the dependent variable is NONEXEC (δ 3 ) or MF (γ 3 ), although none is significantly different from zero. In short, the OLS results in Table 2 We find the INSIDER*POST coefficients are positive and significantly greater than zero at the 5% level. We interpret these findings as evidence that firms with large holdings by directors and officers distributed a larger portion of their profits as dividends, after enactment, than they did before enactment. This is consistent with the individuals who set the dividend/repurchase policy (i.e., the directors and officers), modifying the distribution policy after enactment in a manner that is consistent with their own (and other individual) shareholders'
interests. The NONEXEC*POST and MF*POST coefficients also are positive, but not significantly greater than zero at conventional levels.
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These initial results are consistent with managers responding to the altered tax incentives of directors and officers, but not other individual investors.
Among control variables, the coefficients on RE (retained earnings) are always significantly greater than zero. The coefficients on PERM (operating income), FCF (free cash flow), and SIZE (total assets) are always significantly less than zero.
Primary Regression Results
We now estimate all four-regression equations simultaneously. We find that coefficients estimates are larger and more significant using simultaneous estimation procedures, consistent with joint evaluation of investor and firm responses leading to superior estimates than were detected using separate estimations. We infer from the stronger results that investor and managers responded concurrently to the tax changes in JGTRRA. Table 4 shows the results from estimating all four equations simultaneously using GMM.
For brevity, we report only the coefficients for the key variables. Looking first at insider responses, we find that, when INSIDER is the dependent variable, the coefficient on DIV%*POST (α 3 ) is significantly greater than zero for the Dividend Payers sample at the 5% level. (It is significant at the 10% level using the Dividend Payers and Repurchasers sample.)
This finding is consistent with directors and officers boosting their holdings in their own firms, after enactment, if their firms were distributing relatively large portions of their profits as dividends (i.e., it is consistent with a tax clientele effect).
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The DIV%*POST coefficient of 0.11
implies that an increase of one standard deviation in DIV%*POST or 0.28, would boost insider holdings by three percentage points. This is a substantial increase in holdings by directors and officers because they held only 10% of the firm, on average, before JGTRRA. In contrast, as in Table 2 , we continue to find no evidence that non-executive individuals (δ 3 ) or mutual fund investors (γ 3 ) rebalanced their holdings by shifting toward firms distributing a higher portion of their profits as dividends, as compared with repurchases. Thus, we conclude that directors and 21 Since the percentage of stock held by insiders was declining during the investigation period (see Table 1 ), insiders in high-dividend-paying firms may not have been buying far more shares in their own companies. Instead, perhaps these insiders simply sold few shares in their own companies during this period while insiders in lower dividendpaying firms were unloading large holdings.
officers were the only investor group changing their holdings in response to firm distribution policy.
Looking at manager responses, we find strong evidence that firms held disproportionately by insiders, non-executive individuals, and mutual funds began to distribute a We find that the GMM estimates are substantially stronger than the OLS ones. This is consistent with our expectation that investor and manager responses are simultaneously determined. Evaluating only investors or only managers potentially explains some of the weak and conflicting results from prior JGTRRA studies (see reviews by Dharmapala, 2009, and Shackelford, 2009) . In this analysis, if we were to stop with the OLS results, we would erroneously conclude that no investors rebalanced their portfolios and that the firm responses were limited to those companies with heavy insider ownership. We also would substantially understate the economic significance of legislation as estimated by using the regression coefficients.
Comparisons with Non-Event Periods
This section repeats the analyses detailed above using non-event periods. If the 2003 findings are related to JGTRRA, then we expect the coefficients from the non-event years to be different from the 2003 coefficients. We repeat the tests as if the actual May, 2003 rate reductions had occurred in May, 1994, and include the eight pseudo "pre-enactment" quarters prior to the quarter that includes May, 1994 and the eight pseudo "post-enactment" quarters that follow the quarter that includes May, 1994. We then repeat this seven more times, using May of each year as the pseudo event. when MF is the dependent variable, the DIV%*POST coefficient is 0.01. With Equation (4) Table 5 .
The findings confirm the inferences drawn from the primary tests in Table 4 There is a caveat for this robustness check. The capital gains tax rate fell from 28% to 20% in 1997 without any change in the dividend tax rate. Using the same logic developed in this study, we would have predicted a shift from dividends to repurchases following that rate reduction, albeit of a lesser extent because the rate change was more modest. If that change in the distribution mix did occur, then this sensitivity test using non-event periods would bias in favor of our finding that the 2003 coefficients were more positive than those in previous years.
The reason is that the tax incentives facing individual investors after the rate reductions in 1997 would have called for the mix of distributions to shift toward repurchases and away from dividends. In other words, 1997 was not really a non-event year. 
How Quickly Did Investors and Managers Respond to JGTRRA?
All of the tests so far in this paper aggregate dividends and repurchases over the eight quarters before enactment and the eight quarters after enactment, creating two observations (before and after JGTRRA) for each firm. As discussed above, the reason for aggregation is that, unlike regular, quarterly dividends, repurchases are irregular events, which can lead to highly volatile quarterly measures of DIV%. In this section, we relax this restriction and treat each quarter as a different observation, resulting in 16 observations for each firm. The reason that we shift to quarterly measures here is to enable us to pinpoint the time when investors and managers responded to JGTRRA.
To get GMM quarterly coefficient estimates for the same key six variables examined throughout this study, we suppress the intercept and include a categorical variable for each quarter from the earliest quarter (eight quarters before enactment-the quarter including May 2001) to the most recent quarter (eight quarters after enactment-the quarter including May 2005). We then interact the categorical variable for each of the 16 quarters with the six variables of interest. Table 6 reports 16 quarters of GMM coefficient estimates for the six key variables for the Dividend Payers sample. We find little change across the quarters for the three tax clientele regressions. That is not surprising for estimates when NONEXEC or MF is the dependent variable because we find no evidence anywhere in this study that suggests that non-executive individuals or mutual fund investors rebalanced their portfolios in favor of stocks that pay a larger portion of their payouts through dividends. However, because we find some support for clientele effects among insiders, it is a bit surprising that we cannot detect any cross-quarter changes in coefficient estimates.
Conversely, for manager responses to JGTRRA, we find a sharp increase in the quarterly coefficient estimates during the second quarter following passage, which would be the quarter Brown et al. (2007) , Saez (2006, 2005) , and Aboody and Kasznik (2008) . Those studies treat all dividends paid and shares repurchased in 2003 as responses to JGTRRA, even those declared months before the May 23rd passage of the legislation, (e.g., Microsoft's initial dividend announcement on January 7, 2003). By using the day that the dividends were paid, they even include some dividends declared in 2002, well before President Bush ever mentioned possible dividend tax relief in January 2003 . Brav et al. (2007 state that it is implausible that firms were so clairvoyant that they declared tax-motivated dividends months before passage. Among other factors, President Bush's initial comments were vague and preliminary, and weeks passed before details of his proposal emerged. Furthermore, passage of the highly controversial legislation was uncertain until Vice-President Richard Cheney cast a tie-breaking vote in the U.S. Senate to gain passage of the legislation.
by the negative coefficients), then it is understandable that their tests would have struggled to detect any movement from repurchases to dividends.
V. CLOSING REMARKS
This paper extends our understanding of the effects of shareholder taxes on firm payout policy by estimating a system of equations to quantify the investor and managerial responses to The regression coefficient estimates imply that both the portfolio rebalancing and distribution policy changes following JGTRRA were economically significant.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate investor and managerial responses to JGTRRA using simultaneous equations. We find that the results are much stronger than they Finally, the results in this paper suggest that additional research is needed to understand the role of insiders in the interaction of shareholder taxes and distribution policies. We find that insiders are the only individuals who rebalanced their portfolio in response to the rate changes.
We also find that firms were particularly responsive to the changed tax incentives if directors and officers held large positions. These results join Brown, et al.'s (2007) lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged assets (data58/data44). PERM is operating income (data21 -data5 -data22) scaled by lagged assets (data44). TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM. FCF is defined as income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44). DYIELD is the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14). LEVERAGE is lagged longterm debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44). SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44). S&PRATING is the S&P Common Stock Ranking (SPCSR 7 = A+ etc)÷100. AGE is the number of years the firm is reported on CRSP÷100 as of 2003. SP500 is 1 if the firm is in the S&P500 Index, 0 otherwise. LIQUIDITY is the log of average monthly volume over shares outstanding for the prior year. BETA is market beta estimated over the prior 12 months. IRISK is unsystematic risk, which is estimated as the standard deviation of daily market model residuals over the prior year multiplied by 100. MKTADJRET is the market adjusted returns over the prior year expressed as a%. SALESGR average sales growth over the prior two years (data2/data44). R&DINT is R&D intensity estimated as R&D expense over lagged assets (data4/data44). Missing R&D is set to zero. -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.09 -0.14 -0.38 * Enactment Quarter n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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